



## Twitter and The Ideology of The Party in Indonesia

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**ABSTRACT.** Issues leading up to the 2024 Presidential Election have started to blow. PDI-P elite stated they did not want to form a coalition with the Democrats and PKS because they have different ideologies. This statement led to a response from the PD elite by labeling PDIP as the Masiku Bansos Case Party related to one of the PDI-P party elites involved in the misuse of the Social Assistance program. Another statement triggered a counter-statement from the Chairman of the Tangerang City Branch Management Board. PKS responded by more introspecting. Previous research suggests that content on social media is exciting and raises debate. One of the interesting issues related to politics is the representation of women in government. This study analyzes the political communication of female politicians who are members of the House of Representatives for the period 2019-2024 in conveying messages associated with the Party's ideology. The research method uses content analysis of Twitter messages for the April-June 2021 period. The results show that the PDI-P elite conveys its statement regarding the spirit of nationalism through National Insights. The essence of Democracy, Divinity, the issue of Unity, and reviving Cooperation did not appear. The announcement of the PD Elite has not shown as a Religious Nationalist Party, has not put Corruption and International Issues in the priority of their message. The PKS elite places Religious Issues as *Ukhuwwah Islamiyyah*, Palestine Issues as a form of *Ukhuwwah Basyariyyah*, Development Economic, and Corona Issues as a form of *Ukhuwwah Wathaniyyah*.

**KEYWORDS:** Female Politicians; Party Elite; Political Ideology; Political Communication; Twitter.

### 1. INTRODUCTION

At the end of May 2021, the elite political Party of The Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) revealed a premature statement regarding the 2024 presidential election. PDI-P did not want a coalition with the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) and the Democrat Party (PD) because they had different political ideologies written by JawaPos.com. According to the PDI-P Elite, the Coalition for PDI-P is a political collaboration based on ideology. PDI-P ideology is different from PKS and the PD. It is very tough to form a coalition (Kurniawan & Wibisono, 2021). Likewise, the ideology between PDI-P and PD is not the same. The PD is an electoral party, while the PDI-P is an ideological party. Although it also relies on mass power, its DNA differs from the PD

(Kurniawan & Wibisono, 2021). This argument led to responses from the PKS and the PD. The PKS Party responded casually to the statement via the Twitter account of one of its politicians. Meanwhile, the PD, through one of its politicians' Twitter accounts, responded with a message which then elicited a response from PDI-P party politicians through the Chairman of the PDI-P South Tangerang City branch.

Today, the media landscape is changing significantly due to globalization, socialization, the concentration of media companies, deregulation of media ownership, and digitization (Klinger & Svensson, 2015). Seventy-three percent of social media users are between the ages of 30 and 49. About 57 percent of them are 50 to 64 years old. Meanwhile, internet users over 65 are 38 percent (Gainos & Wagner, 2014).

Previous research on the importance of social media networks for understanding political thought was conducted by (Sen & Hill, 2006; Bennett, 2008; Wagner, 2010; Kahne & Middaugh, 2012; Smith, 2012; Gajos & Wagner, 2014). Other research on the Internet and technology that affects political participation includes analysis (Bode, 2012; Boulianne, 2009; Wagner, 2010; Gajos & Wagner, 2014; Masduki et al., 2020). Other studies are more specific about the influence and relationship between social media use and political participation (Bode, 2012; Wagner, 2010; Gil de Zúñiga et al., 2012; Masduki et al., 2020).

Research by (Kahne & Middaugh, 2012) found that socialization carried out by families, educational institutions, mass media, and government agencies has not changed a person's view. How political elites communicate with the public can change people's views. When the political Elite responds to netizen comments with unfriendliness, the voter's assessment of the political Elite can be damaging. Political elites who often use netizen comments as informal or formal interactions shape voters' views to be more positive or negative (Kahne & Middaugh, 2012).

Social media is an effective platform for politicians to convey political narratives in their favor (Heredia et al., 2018; McGregor, 2020; Jost et al., 2018). Compared to other sources of information, social media has gained more popularity and trust (Kim, 2011; Zhang & Gupta, 2018). Unregulated social media platforms allow critics and anti-government agencies to produce unbiased information (Al-Hussein, 2020; Bennett & Livingston, 2018). Elites use social media to influence the public to approve and support their agenda (Al-Hussein, 2020) Many people are consumers and tend to believe in content disseminated on social media (Happer & Philo, 2013). Jha & Sarangi (2017) find a direct relationship between penetration and corruption. If press freedom is restricted, social media will fill the gap to get praise (Zhu et al., 2013; Brunetti & Weder, 2003). Social media is an effective channel for promoting political awareness (Al-Hussein, 2020). Twitter is the medium used by Elite to convey information and is a better

platform than Instagram or YouTube (Pierri et al., 2021). The content discussed on social media is very interesting, capable of causing debate. One of the exciting issues in politics is the representation of women (Octafitria, 2018).

In Indonesia, there are nine election-winning parties: the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P), the Golkar Party (Golkar), the United Development Party (PPP), the National Awakening Party (PKB), the Democratic Party (PD), the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), The National Mandate Party (PAN), the National Democratic Party (Nasdem), and the Greater Indonesia Movement Party (Gerindra). Indonesia applies a quota of 30 percent for women's representation. In the 2019 DPR general election, there were 117 women seats or 20 percent of the total 575 seats, an increase of 20 percent from the 2014 elections (Setyawan, 2019).

It is interesting to study the social media used by female politicians who are members of the Indonesian House of Representatives for the 2019-2024 period in conveying political messages during the April-June 2021 period related to their Party's political ideology. This study focuses on messages transmitted through Twitter, then to see how Elit conveys the information, distribution message, whether the statements are related to the ideology of their political Party? This study offers contributions: First, innovation in identifying the form of political messages through Twitter. Second, innovation in the form of message priority. Third, innovation in the awareness of ideological understanding and how to convey that message to their constituent. This research will also add to the theory and literature about the characteristics of messages disseminated by the political Elite in Indonesia to the public via Twitter, especially the PDI-P, PD, and PKS parties

## 2. METHOD

This study uses content analysis which is a scientific technique to interpret text or content. According to (Krippendorff, 2004), content analysis does not limit text to written products but can also be in the form of "other

meaningful matter" so that it can also be in the form of paintings, pictures, maps, sounds, or symbols.


To interpret the content, the author analyzes the relationship between texts in the form of tweets with one another so that they have a significant meaning, then puts them into categories and interprets them in an overall sense. This study focuses more on a descriptive approach to describing a message's aspects or characters (Eriyanto, 2011). This study represents the aspect, context, or character of the tweets delivered by the female political elites of the PDI-P, PD, and PKS parties related to party ideology.

The method used in this research is qualitative. Researchers analyze the interpreted content to find theoretical significance (Fields, 1988). Group words with the same meaning into categories to build a conceptual model or system (Elo & Kyngäs, 2008). The author starts by using an inductive approach to analyze the data qualitatively. This inductive analysis develops categories to find concepts, themes, or models based on analyst interpretations (Thomas, 2006). The author sorts out which data is more important or less important to be categorized. Two coders assisted the writer in entering the raw data into categories. Researchers collected data during the period from April 1 to June 30, 2021. Of the nine parties winning the 2019 election, there were 118 female members of the House of Representatives (dpr.go.id, 2019).

The primary data of this research are tweets made by female political elites from the PDIP, PD, and PKS parties. This study uses data collection techniques with the NVivo 12 plus analysis program. This application allows researchers to collect data and code the tweets made by the political Elite during the research period. Data from active accounts is withdrawn and analyzed. Then coding is carried out on the messages conveyed through the party elite's Twitter. Then categorization is carried out based on the messages sent in the Twitter accounts of each party elite.

The researcher uses the qualitative content analysis method, summative content analysis, which is a method to get the essence of a complex text and discover the importance of the text and its impact on the reader or audience (Rapport, 2010). The next step in this research is to carry out a summative

(qualitative) content analysis of each of the categorized tweets by critically analyzing whether these tweets have a relationship between messages conveyed by political party elites via Twitter and party ideology.



3. FIGURE 1. CONTENT ANALYSIS PROCESS

4.

## 5. RESULT AND DISCUSSION

Nine parties won the 2019 General Election. PDI-P State cannot form a coalition with PD and PKS because they have different ideologies (Kurniawan & Wibisono, 2021). PDI-P is a nationalist party rooted in the Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI) under the spirit of Soekarno. This Party has a vision as "a tool of struggle to shape and build the nation's character based on Pancasila June 1, 1945", instilling the spirit of Nationalism, Democracy, and Divinity (Tri Sila), against Individualism and revive the spirit of Cooperation (Eka Sila) (Setyawan, 2019). The PD claims to be a religious-nationalist party that prioritizes clean, thoughtful, and polite ethics (Mubarak, 2019) with a vision of achieving enlightenment in the nation's life, placing the principles of nationalism, humanism, and internationalism (Setyawan, 2019). Meanwhile, PKS identifies as a party with an exclusively Islamic platform which later becomes inclusive (pks.id, 2020). PKS accepts non-Islamic legislative candidates. However, the formation of PKS from the cadres of the Campus *Da'wah* Institute made it difficult for a party inspired by the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt to form an open identity (Fuad, 2019). PKS has a vision of realizing a just, prosperous, and dignified civil society, based on the faith of values and norms, democracy, and the spirit of Mutual-

Cooperation, with "Ukhuwwah Islamiyyah (Islamic bonds), Ukhuwwah Wathaniyyah (national bonds)," and Ukhuwwah Basyariyyah (Islamic bonds). Humanity, within the framework of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia" (Setyawan, 2019).

Members of the House of Representatives from the PDI-P, PD, and PKS parties are 46 female elites, consisting of the PDI-P faction with 25 members, PD with 11 members, and PKS with eight members, who actively use Twitter with 13 members. As the Party with the most seats in the DPR, the PDI-P Party uses Twitter the least, which is only 11 percent, the PD uses Twitter the most at 54.5 percent, and PKS 50 percent, as shown in Figure 2. below:




Figure 2. Parliament Member Twitter Actively  
Source: (Text Analysis, 2021)

The PDI-P Party members who actively use Twitter are RDP, SR, and MCB. PD have politicians as: MLS, VV, LM, SM, LI, and AMI. Elites who actively use Twitter from the PKS Party, are: NZ, KM, LH, and NP who are also the former Governor of West Java.

The PDI-P Elite, RDP, is the most active in sending messages through Twitter, with 49 tweets (2 tweets a day). The most frequently conveyed tweets: Regulations 15 times (the "Cipta Kerja" Law Plans), Greetings 9 times, Economic and Development (the future of Indonesia's aerospace industry, Indonesian Regency Government Association). Insights of Nationality (Webinar Pancasila, Globalization and Radicalism, Soekarno Thoughts, The Power of Pancasila) amounted to the exact seven times, as shown in Figure 3.




Figure 3. Tweets of PDIP Women's Elites  
Source: (Text Analysis, 2021)

The Elite of the PD who sent the most messages was SM 122 times (3 tweets in 2 days). Leadership Issues 41 times, Agus Harimurti Yudoyono (AHY) 15 times, Soesilo Bambang Yudoyono (SBY) 11 times, Syarif Hidayat 2 times, Edhie Baskoro 3 times, Alya Baskoro 2 times, Jokowi 4 times, Annisa Pohan 2 times, Dede Yusuf 1 time, and the Chief Justice of the Court 1 time, Greetings 18 times, Economic Development 14 times (Garuda chaos, Indonesia's debt a lot, management of hajj funds, food taxes, online loans, regional owned enterprises, economic situation, Supporting the Indonesian Economic Order, basic electricity tariffs, road construction), it will find in Figure 4.




Figure 4. Democrat Women's Elites Tweet  
Source: (Text Analysis, 2021)

The PKS party elite who tweeted the most was KM with 142 tweets (3 times in 2 days). The message delivered was in the form of Islamic Greetings 32 times; All of her colleagues also showed these Islamic Greetings, NP 45 times, NZ 21 times, and LH 6 times, all of which were the highest tweets from the message nodes conveyed. 29 times international issues (Malaysian PKS, Palestine, and the UN Security Council), 18 times Corona issues (Covid Hospital bills, Distance Rules, corona cases, emergency brakes, meetings on Corona Virus, vaccines, health procedures, rapid tests, and masks), as shown in Figure 5:




Figure 5. Tweets of PKS Women's Elites  
Source: (Text Analysis, 2021)

Of the 24 message classifications, the PKS elite tweeted the most 348 times (4 tweets per day). PD 254 times (3 tweets per day), PDI-P 81 times (1 time per day). The top five issues in messages conveyed by the PKS Party elite were Greetings 94 times, International 57 times, Religious 50 times, Economic Development 31 times, and Corona 25 times. The PD elites raised the Issue of Leadership 81 times, the Party 42 times, Greetings 32 times, Economic Development 23 times, and Donations 22 times. The Elite of the PDI-P delivered the most messages in Greetings 21 tweets, Regulation 16 times, Personal 9 times, National Insights and Development Economist 7 times each.




Figure 6. Twitter members of the Indonesian House of Representatives from the PDI-P, Democrat, and PKS Period April-June 2021  
Source: (Text Analysis, 2021)

Of the three parties, the PDI-P Elite conveyed messages at least 81 times. The top tweets consist of Greetings 21 times, Regulations in the form of a Cipta Kerja bill meeting 16 times, Personal 9 times (documentation, absorption of aspirations, activities of the DPP chairman, reflection, and hope), National Insights and Development Economist Issues both totaling 7 times. PDI-P is a nationalist party rooted in the Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI) under the spirit of Soekarno. This Party has a vision as "a tool of struggle to shape and build the nation's character based on Pancasila June 1, 1945", instilling the spirit of nationalism, democracy, and divinity (Tri Sila), opposing Individualism and revive the spirit of gotong royong (Eka Sila) (Setyawan, 2019). The spirit of nationalism is expressed in the National Vision, which talks about the understanding of Pancasila, but has not put forward the Party's vision that instills the spirit of democracy and divinity in the priority of the message. The Elite of PDI-P didn't prioritize yet in Democracy, God, the Issue of Unity, and reviving Mutual-Cooperation.

As a party that has just experienced shocks due to dualism, PD seems want to strengthen the leadership of its Party. The Leaders Issue is the top Issue 81 times, characterizing AHY as the son of SBY, the

Founder of the Party, and the former president of the Republic of Indonesia. This characterization is such a dynasty, apart from AHY, AHY's sister Edhie Baskoro (Ibas), AHY's wife Annisa Pohan, and AHY's sister-in-law Alya. The PD Elite also raised the Issue of the Party as the top Issue 42 times, Greetings, Economic Development Issues which also highlighted the development economy run by the ruling Party (PDI-P) 23 times. This message reflects one form of the PD's vision, namely achieving enlightenment in the nation's life, placing the principles of nationalism, Humanism, and Internationalism (Setyawan, 2019), but has not raised the issue of internationalism. The next Issue is Donations 22 times. As a Religious Nationalist Party, PD Elite has not placed religiosity in its priority messages. PD Elite has not shown it to be a Nationalist Party that is also Religious. As a party that puts forward clean, intelligent, and polite ethics, the statements of the PD Elite have not placed Corruption Issues as a priority.

As an Islamic party, PKS has the vision to create a just, prosperous, and dignified civil society based on values and norms based on faith. Besides that, democracy, the spirit of Cooperation through "Ukhuwwah Islamiyyah (Islamic ties), Ukhuwwah Wathaniyyah (national bonds), and Ukhuwwah Basyariyyah (humanitarian bonds), within the framework of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia", because of that religious messages are thick in the Social media Twitter of the PKS party elite, Islamic Greetings and International Issues are essential. As a party that also realizes the importance of support, PKS places Greetings at the top position. The Palestinian issue is an international issue related to colonialism on earth that must be abolished under the 1945 Constitution. The Palestinian issue is echoed as a form of Ukhuwwah Basyariyyah (humanitarian bonds). The development economy is also the highest concern of the PKS elite as an opposition party highlighting the development economy carried out by the ruling Party (PDIP) 31 times, the Corona issue 25 times, is an essential thing as a form of Ukhuwwah Wathaniyyah (national bond).

## 6. CONCLUSION

Of the 46 elites, 13 elite female members of the Indonesian House of Representatives actively use Twitter. Even though they get the most seats in the DPR, the PDI-P Elite uses Twitter the least, which is 11 percent, while the Elite that uses Twitter the most from the PD is 60 percent, and PKS is 50 percent.

RDP is the most active PDI-P Elite using Twitter every 2 days. The most often conveyed messages are about Regulations, Greetings, National Insights, and Economic Development Issues. The Elite of PD who tweets the most is SM, whose statements are more about Leadership, Greetings, and Economic Development Issues. The PKS elite who tweeted the most was KM. The messages conveyed most often are Islamic Greetings, International, and Corona issues.

PKS is a party whose elites have put their Party's ideology into Twitter messages. In contrast, the PD and PDIP still have to place more notes to provide space for messages related to their Party's ideology.

PDIP applies the spirit of nationalism through the National Insight with the understanding of Pancasila on June 1, 1945. For PDI-P, this is not clear yet. Meanwhile, the spirit of Democracy, Divinity, the Issue of Unity, and reviving Mutual-Cooperation has not been a message priority.

As a party that has just experienced a shock due to the dualism of camps, the Elite of PD wants to strengthen Agus Harimurti Yudhoyono's (AHY), the son of the Founder of the Party who is also the former president of the Republic of Indonesia, SBY. PD seems to be a dynastic party. It shows the message in the form of AHY, AHY's wife, AHY's brother, and AHY's sister-in-law. PD tried to strengthen the position of the Party. As a Religious Nationalist Party, PD has not shown itself to be a Nationalist Party that is also Religious. As a party that puts forward clean, intelligent, and polite ethics, the Elite of PD's statements have not placed the issue of corruption as a concern, and PD has not highlighted international issues in the message on Twitter.

The PKS Party places the top on Greetings, International, Religious, Economic Development, and Corona Issues. As an Islamic party, religious messages become the third Issue after Greetings and International Issues.

As a party that still desperately needs support, PKS places Islamic Greetings as the most important thing. The Issue of Palestine is highlighted as a form of concern for colonialism in the international world as a form of Ukhuwwah Basyariyyah (humanitarian bonds). Economic and Development Issues are also the most significant concern of the PKS elite and the Corona issue as a form of Ukhuwwah Wathaniyyah (national bonds).

## 7. LIMITATION AND STUDY FORWARD

This research only describes a message from the elite woman of the PDI-P Party, Democrat, and PKS. It would be better if all elites, both female and male members of the House of Representatives, represented their factions; of course, it would better describe the representation of the Elite in conveying their messages. Further research will undoubtedly better describe the political Elite in delivering information on other social media comparing with Twitter.

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