As a key component of the "Internet of Things (IoT)", "Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs)" are becoming more crucial. For environmental observation, "Sensor Nodes (SN)" were dispersed randomly within WSNs. Deploying solely content-based security methods exposes WSNs susceptible to eavesdropping from both external and internal attackers in this kind of setting. Context confidentiality becomes an essential component of WSN security that should never be ignored since it could be used by an intruder to determine the location of the origin or even the "Sink Node (SiN)". There are several uses for WSN, which could be deployed to send confidential data. Implementing protective mechanisms to prohibit the attacker from compromising and revealing the origin and SiN's geolocation is crucial for keeping confidential material secure. Several traditional approaches for modeling privacy involve unnecessary computational complexity amongst SNs because of their restricted processing capacity, thereby impacting the WSN network's energy efficiency. Under this research, we suggest a new protocol called "Hashing Signature Code (HSC)" to solve the privacy concerns of traditional WSNs by striking a balance between the two competing criteria of communication efficiency and resource consumption. The suggested HSC protocol authorizes SNs with the use of a "Pairing keys (PK)" conception mechanism. Only SiN and SNs have access to the proposed HSC system's special shared key entity. There is no need for a certificate-based authenticating scheme when working with two separate SNs to build a PK. The SNs inside a specific cluster have a common key. With its secure authenticating procedure, the proposed HSC security modeling can withstand clone and imposter threats. The proposed HSC protocol provides higher levels of security than the existing "Elliptic Curve Cryptographic (ECC)" method in terms of "Security Ratio","Energy Consumption Ratio", "Computation Time",and "Key Generation Time" as determined by the assessment methodologies used for both approaches.